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The Law of Intangible Assets: The Philosophical




Secret business information merits strong legal protection. Secret busi-
ness information is not only a sine qua non of the market economy, but it is
also intangible, and therefore vulnerable by nature.' The law of trade secrets
protects this valuable information.2 Trade secret law, with its bifurcated juris-
prudential roots in relational duties and property rights,3 also draws upon the
legally-entrenched principles of tort and contract.4 The law of trade secrets is
integral to the market economy. It helps enforce fair competition between
businesses, stimulate innovation, and boost economic development.5 Broadly
speaking, trade secret law protects information developed and used by vari-
ous business entities to supply a distinct product or service to the public.6 As
such, businesses would have little incentive to invent new products or ser-
vices. Without the protection of trade secret law,7 market competitors would
likely capitalize on the secret information by obtaining it through improper
means and use it to deliver the same or improved products or services at a
lesser cost.8 This unethical behavior would naturally lead to unfair results.
While one company invests hefty amounts of money into its research and
development to produce valuable products or services, another may siphon
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1. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 987 (1984).
2. See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 1, 13 (2007) (citing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868)).
3. Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences, 15
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 41 (2007).
4. Id. at 42:
5. 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1:4: THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION (2016 ed.).
6. See Risch, supra note 2, at 7-8; see also Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon
or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade
Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 70 (1999).
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 294 (2003).
8. See, e.g., id.
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off its secret information without the equivalent development and production
costs. 9
Two key points merit further consideration. First, information is intangi-
ble by nature, thus raising a concern about the justification for its legal pro-
tection.1o Second is the need to determine the extent of that protection."
These two points are interrelated. The stronger the justification for legal pro-
tection, the stronger the protection should be.12 The intangible nature of in-
formation renders it amorphous and vulnerable to misappropriation.13 These
qualities necessitate its strong legal protection.14 This protection chiefly rests
on the theoretical underpinnings of natural law jurisprudence, originally rec-
ognized and utilized by American courts in adjudicating trade secret as prop-
erty.15 To be clear, "property" refers to the term as it was originally
conceived by the seventeenth century British philosopher John Locke.16
II. TRADE SECRET LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS
EVOLUTION AND IMPORTANCE
A. The Evolution of Trade Secret Law
1. Definition of a Trade Secret
Until 1979, American courts relied on the Restatement of Torts to adju-
dicate trade secret misappropriation cases. Under the Restatement, a trade
secret is defined as follows:
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or
use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
9. Id.
10. See id. at 310.
11. See id. at 311.
12. See Chiappetta, supra note 6, at 72 ("Whether we treat trade secret law as
creating a duty of confidence, as contract, as protecting property rights, quasi
or full-fledged, or as a separate doctrine founded on its own justifications, will
profoundly affect the outcome.").
13. See id. at 73 (distinguishing two categories of trade secret misappropriation: (1)
"breach of duty"; and (2) "bad acts").
14. See id. at 165 n.1 13 ("Unlike physical goods or land which can only be pos-
sessed by one person or group at a time, ideas can be possessed and used by
numerous people simultaneously.").
15. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Adminis-
trative State, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 2001, 2022 (2009).
16. See, e.g., id. at 2020-22.
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manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a
machine or other device, or a list of customers.17
However, in 1979, the enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)
altered the definition of trade secret. For the most part, the enactment of the
UTSA was meant to solve the lack of uniformity and predictability under the
Restatement's definition in adjudication of trade secret cases.18 Forty-eight
states have thus far adopted some form of the UTSA,19 which defines a trade
secret as follows:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) derives indepen-
dent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 20
The UTSA's definition is more favorable to trade secret owners than the
Restatement's in at least two respects. First, the UTSA protects information
of economic value, so long as its owner takes reasonable steps to ensure that
the information remains secret.2 1 Second, the UTSA protects secret business
information that the owner possesses, despite whether it is used in develop-
ing a given product or service.22 Both of the definitions, however, underscore
the notion that the protection of trade secret law only extends to information
that is, in fact, secret.23
17. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
18. Sarah Gettings, Burbank Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski: Frustrating
Uniformity in Trade Secret Law, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 423, 428-29 (2007).
19. See EDWARD H. PAPPAS & DANIEL D. QUICK, TRADE SECRETS: PROTECTION
AND REMEDIES, 43-3rd C.P.S., Worksheet 2 Applying the Uniform Trade Se-
cret Act (BNA 2012) (Massachusetts and New York continue to apply common
law in trade secret cases).
20. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (1985). In 1995, the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition introduced a third definition of trade secrets. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 ("A trade secret is any information that
can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is suffi-
ciently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage
over others."). However, this definition never reached the level of popularity of
the other two definitions, and this paper will not discuss it.
21. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. at 6-7 (1985).
22. Id.
23. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985); see also RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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2. Trade Secret Infringement Claims, Bodies of Law Protecting
Trade Secrets, and Remedies
Several causes of action are available to impose liability for unautho-
rized use or disclosure of a trade secret.24 In civil actions, plaintiffs ordinarily
rely on tort or contract law.25 For example, plaintiffs can claim breach of an
express contract such as a nondisclosure or a non-competition agreement. 26 If
plaintiffs successfully establish a breach of contract, they may recover the
loss of the trade secret's value and consequential damages, reduced by any
benefit the trade secret owner received from the breach.27 Absent express
contractual agreements, some jurisdictions may still find trade secret misap-
propriation from breach of contracts implied in fact or in law.28 To find mis-
appropriation based upon breach of a contract implied in law, courts look for
a reasonable inference of preexisting confidential relationships.29 The re-
quirement of such relationships to impose liability is a fundamental weakness
of contractual remedies. Contract law is powerless to protect trade secret
holders from misappropriations by third parties because, by definition, no
confidential relationship or privity exists. 30 Under such circumstances, plain-
tiffs may nonetheless assert misappropriation by relying on the UTSA or its
equivalent under state law. 3 1 In jurisdictions without a UTSA equivalent,
plaintiffs may assert the common law tort of misappropriation.3 2 Under both
common law and the UTSA, equitable remedies such as preliminary and per-
manent injunctions,33 and remedies at law such as compensatory and punitive
damages, are available.34
24. See PAPPAS & QUICK, supra note 19, § 7, at B-1.
25. Id.
26. Id. at B-1, B-2 (discussing benefits and detriments of nondisclosure agree-
ments versus non-compete agreements).
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id.
29. See PAPPAS & QUICK, supra note 19, § 7, at B-3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 4 (even with the enactment of the UTSA, courts nevertheless heavily
rely upon the relevant case law in interpreting statutory trade secret misappro-
priation claims) (internal citations omitted).
33. See id. at 9-10 (stating permanent injunctions are available only when reme-
dies at law are inadequate or misappropriation is egregious; courts will also
examine plaintiffs' conduct for any wrongdoing).
34. See id. at 4 (discussing that in appropriate circumstances, it is possible to re-
cover compensatory damages in addition to injunctive relief).
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Apart from civil actions, many states impose statutory criminal liability
for trade secret misappropriation.35 Under one type of criminal statute, divul-
gence of trade secrets that belong to state regulatory bodies is a misde-
meanor. 36 Another type imposes criminal liability for private employees'
divulgence of their employers' trade secrets. 37 Similarly, the Economic Espi-
onage Act of 1996 imposes criminal liability for the theft or attempt thereof
of trade secrets for the benefit of foreign entities.38
B. The Importance of Trade Secret Law39
In the sophisticated market economy of the United States, where small
businesses and large corporations compete for customers and profits, the pos-
session of economically valuable trade secret information is paramount.
When a business develops such information, it gains a competitive advantage
in attracting more customers and increasing its revenues. 40 However, the de-
velopment of such information is merely the first move in the game of mar-
ketplace competition. Companies must then keep information secret from
their competitors' covetous gaze so they may deliver a distinct product or
service to the market.41
Keeping such information secret is no easy task. Not only do companies
need to develop effective business management strategies, but they must also
have strong legal protection that renders their strategies effective. Absent ad-
equate legal protection of valuable trade secret information, self-contained
business strategies-no matter how effective-leave businesses vulnerable
to information misappropriation. Most notably, vulnerability arises in situa-
tions that require businesses to invest in complex and expensive forms of
protection that may depress businesses' revenues. Absent strong legal protec-
tion, businesses may also be exposed to vulnerability via the so-called threat
of the Trojan horse. This threat is most obnoxious because it emerges from
businesses' own employees. This occurs when an employee, who in the
35. PAPPAS & QUICK, supra note 19, § 7, at C-1.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 7, at D-2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)).
39. See JAGER, supra note 5, § 1:1 (The importance of trade secret law has become
more pronounced in recent years for three main reasons: (1) "the applicability
and validity of other forms of legal protection for intellectual property in many
of the emerging technologies have been fraught with uncertainty"; (2) "the
technology is changing so rapidly that it is outstripping the existing laws
intended to encourage and protect inventions and innovations"; and (3) "the
relative ease of creating and controlling trade secret rights").
40. See Risch, supra note 2, at 7-8.
41. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (1985); see also RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (legal protection extends only to information that
maintains its secrecy).
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course of changing his or her employment to a competitor, unveils its former
employer's secret business information. Thus, the need for well-defined rules
of equitable business conduct is clear. These rules would serve as the essen-
tial ammunition in the competitive business battle.
1. The Economic Benefits of Trade Secret Law
The law of trade secrets offers such ammunition-a comprehensive and
pliable legal framework.42 A species of intellectual property law, trade secret
law allows companies to keep their economically valuable business informa-
tion indeterminately secret. 43 An important justification of trade secret law44
is "the economic benefits that flow from [trade secrets'] existence, most no-
tably incentives for businesses to spend less money protecting secret infor-
mation or attempting to appropriate secret information."45 By providing legal
protection for economically valuable secret business information, trade secret
law incentivizes businesses to invest in areas such as market research and
development.46 Market research enables companies to gather information that
facilitates the invention of higher quality and lower priced products and ser-
vices. 4 7 As Professor Chiappetta observes:
[t]rade secrets increasingly constitute a central aspect of acquisi-
tions and licensing programs, as well as a key component of busi-
ness asset portfolios used for capital raising, joint research and
development, and obtaining general competitive advantage. Busi-
nesses and their legal advisors clearly believe that trade secret law
matters. 48
42. See Graves, supra note 3, at 47 (explaining that a property conception of trade
secret law may help convince courts to interpret the law in a way that affords
an adequate degree of legal protection to trade secret information).
43. See Risch, supra note 2, at 11; see also JAGER, supra note 5, § 1:16.
44. JAGER, supra note 5, § 1:18 ("The trilogy of public policies underlying trade
secret laws are now: (1) the maintenance of commercial morality; (2) the en-
couragement of invention and innovation; and (3) the protection of the funda-
mental right of privacy of the trade secret owner.") (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155-56 (1989)).
45. Risch, supra note 2, at 5; see also Chiappetta, supra note 6, at 69 (stating that
one commentator argues that "two current trade secret justifications, incentive
to invention and maintenance of commercial ethics, are embarrassingly inade-
quate" such that "[u]nless we fill [the trade secret law's] normative gap, it is
time to close up the trade secret shop.") (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1973)).
46. See Chiappetta, supra note 6, at 86-87.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 71-72.
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It matters because trade secret law stimulates business inventions that in turn
contribute to the bourgeoning of the economy, ultimately translating into an
increased standard of living across the nation.49 The need for trade secret law
is so crucial to the U.S. economy that in 2013 the White House implemented
a "Strategy to Mitigate the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets" initiative.50 The initi-
ative has five key elements that focus on combatting external and internal
threats of trade secret misappropriation.51 Despite the increased focus on
trade secret law, there remain the perennial concerns about trade secret law's
impact on restraints of trade.52
a. The Concern that Trade Secret Law Restrains Trade is
Unjustified
While research and innovation are worthy justifications for trade secret
law that confirm the need for strong legal protection of trade secrets, these
justifications should be carefully balanced against the restraints of trade con-
cern.5 3 To elaborate, whereas the restraints of trade concern is buttressed by
the desire to foster free market competition by encouraging uninhibited use
of information and ideas in the public domain, the impetus that trade secret
law provides to research and innovation springs from the recognition that
businesses have proprietary rights in the ideas and information they de-
velop.54 Thus, the promotion of research and innovation as one of trade secret
law's justifications can be at loggerheads with the restraints of trade con-
cern. 55 For example, when a company prohibits its employee from divulging
secret business information that the employee became privy to in the course
of employment, it discourages the employee from seeking better-suited em-
ployment from competitors.56 However, if secret business information is un-
derstood as a property right, the restraints of trade concern becomes less
pronounced because such understanding helps clearly establish the bounds of
49. See id. at 86-87.
50. PAPPAS & QUICK, supra note 19, § 7, at A-2.
51. Id. (stating the five elements that comprise the White House initiative: (1) "dip-
lomatic outreach"; (2) "promoting best practices in the private sector"; (3) "in-
creased efforts by law enforcement"; (4) "legislative changes"; and (5)
"increasing public awareness of the threat.").




56. See Madhavi Sunder, Trade Secret and Human Freedom, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAw 334, 335 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed.,
2013).
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what is permissible employee behavior.57 Understanding trade secrets as
property discourages employers from seeking to improperly obtain trade se-
cret information from new employees by clearly defining employer
expectations.58
However, it may be observed that the proprietary view of trade secrets
unfairly affords businesses greater leverage over their employees, thereby
rendering the employer-employee relationship less propitious, especially
when the employee may have invented or substantially contributed to the
invention or research of a secret formula for a product or service.59 In this
context, the property view of trade secrets admittedly becomes much less
supportable. It should be remembered, however, that the nature of things
compels a certain degree of inequality in human relationships. The key to
dealing with the natural inequality inherent in human relationships is to re-
frain from abusing it.60 Some commentators recognize this natural inequality,
tending to seek its resolution one-sidedly and in favor of employees. For
example, as Professor Sunder said:
Although trade secret is a tool for incentivizing the production of
valuable information and efficient disclosure, it is also more than
that. Trade secret law regulates social relations between employ-
ers and employees. This is the law of nondisclosure agreements
and implied duties on employees not to reveal working knowledge
learned and developed on the job. In short, trade secret law impli-
cates fundamental human freedoms, namely the freedom to move,
to work, to compete, and to think.61
To Professor Sunder, the recognizable economic benefits of trade secret law
should in no way undercut employees' freedom in making employment deci-
sions. Sunder's view of trade secret law aligns with the contractarian legal
philosophy that steers away from viewing secret business information as
property, but rather towards excessively elevating the employer-employee re-
lationship by contractual means. 62
57. See Risch, supra note 2, at 22-23 (citing Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523, 525
(1837)).
58. See id. at 28, 31.
59. See Sunder, supra note 56, at 348.
60. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF THE INE-
QUALITY OF MANKIND (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1955) (1755).
61. Sunder, supra note 56, at 335, 342 (stating that proponents of the contractarian
theory urge that the role of trade secret law is to regulate "relations between
employers and employees.").
62. Id. at 341-44 (citing Kim LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND
EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1988) (exploring how Anglo-American le-
gal milieu understands and governs secrets)).
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Maintaining good employer-employee relationships is necessary for
several reasons, including increasing a business's bottom-line to create more
jobs. Trade secret law, however, does not aim at curtailing employee free-
dom in making employment decisions but rather polices theft of economi-
cally valuable business information.63 More emphatically, trade secret law
imposes liability only for improperly acquiring or using economically valua-
ble secret business information and attaches no liability for gaining such in-
formation by legally proper means-independent discovery or reverse
engineering.M
In other words, limiting an employee's freedom allows businesses to
fairly compete in the market economy by developing trade secret information
and delivering new products and services for profit.65 When businesses de-
velop secret information, they ordinarily invest substantial resources with the
expectation of recouping them upon production and introduction of a service
or product into the marketplace.66 While these resources are not limited to
financial ones and also include human talent, businesses expect that their
employees work for the businesses' benefit. Despite employees' input into a
given project, their professional mobility should not implicate their disclo-
sure of secret business information that belongs to their former employer.
Employees should avoid taking advantage of their former employers and
should not feel compelled to disclose information. Professor Sunder suggests
using employment contracts and nondisclosure agreements as a solution to
resolve potential employee disclosure problems.67 Such an inorganic, artifi-
cial, and purely legal solution would merely align trade secret law with the
contractarian legal philosophy, without giving the potency of legal protection
that trade secrets deserve and, frankly, require.6 8
63. See id. at 336-37.
64. Id. at 337; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1973)
("[R]everse engineering .. . is ... starting with the known product and working
backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture.").
65. Chiappetta, supra note 6, at 71.
66. See id.
67. JAGER, supra note 5, §§ 1:9-1:11 (noting that American courts have long rec-
ognized that contracts to protect trade secrets fail to violate public policy
against restraints of trade).
68. Chiappetta, supra note 6, at 74 ("[T]rade secrets are more than contract rights
or duties of confidence; they deserve the same protection afforded any other
substantial legally protected interest from government usurpation for public
use. In remedial contexts, the policy objectives support applying 'property
rules' remedies, such as injunctions, rather than 'liability rules' remedies like
compensatory damages.").
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The contractarian solution may be necessary, but it is far from being
sufficient.69 After all, no company would delight in having the prospect of
expending its funds-that are better suited for business development-to liti-
gate the enforceability of its employees' contracts. Furthermore, the con-
tractarian solution has a narrow focus, only offering legal protection from
employee disclosures of trade secrets, while not protecting disclosure threats
from those with whom a business has no connection or contractual privity.70
Once economically valuable secret business information becomes accepted
as a property right with potent legal remedies, employees would necessarily
know their legal obligation to respect the intangible assets that belong to their
employer. Employees would know the limits of what is permissible em-
ployee behavior.
Furthermore, recognition of the proprietary nature of trade secrets
would give an unequivocal notice of legal boundaries to those with whom
businesses have no privity. While to the contractarians, nondisclosure and
nonsolicitation agreements offer optimal solutions to the legal protection of
trade secrets, such solutions provide no legal protection to businesses from
third-party misappropriation of trade secrets and may tip the balance of
power in favor of employees. The contractarian commentators show concern
that a strong legal protection of trade secrets may curtail employee freedom.
As Professor Sunder explains, "There are deep connections between law, in-
novation, freedom, and democracy. Too strong trade secret law hampers the
ability of employees to move, to work, to learn, to think, and to develop their
own human capital."71 However, affording strong legal protection to trade
secrets fails to undermine employee freedom because it does not implicate
"draconian limits on the mobility of employees" reminiscent of the medieval
guild systems. 72 A stronger legal protection does, however, need to give a
clear notice of businesses' proprietary rights in the information they develop.
Accepting trade secrets as a form of property achieves a more balanced dis-
tribution of legal obligations between businesses, employees, and the public
by inculcating the requisite respect for the ownership right through proper
legal means.
69. JAGER, supra note 5, § 1:13 (To illustrate the necessity of using contracts as
vehicles that afford a legal protection to trade secrets: "The thousands of ex-
isting contracts sharing trade secrets have created beneficial economic activity,
measuring in the billions of dollars, both within the United States and
abroad.").
70. See Sunder, supra note 56, at 336-37, 341-44.
71. Id. at 350.
72. Id. at 343.
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b. Trade Secrets Should be Regarded as a Form of Property
Right
It is customary to think of property as necessarily implicating tangible
attributes. The ordinary train of thought proceeds along clich6d tracks: if it
can be touched, then it must be someone's property. Intangibles such as in-
formation, on the other hand, fail to inevitably evoke such associations. But
intangible assets-particularly when someone invests their time and ideas to
produce them-should be understood as property in the same or substantially
similar sense as tangible assets. As Judge Easterbrook notes, "a right to ex-
clude in intellectual property is no different in principle from the right to
exclude in physical property."73 While Judge Easterbrook refers to property
rights from the legal realists' perspective,74 he displays an unerring sense that
economically valuable secret information should be considered as property.
However, when perceived from the legal realists' perspective, property rights
represent a hazy notion of the bundle of rights as Wesley Hohfeld conceived
it.75
2. Legal Realism and Its Derogation of a Property Right
Drawing upon Hohfeld's theory, legal realists "redefined property as a
'bundle' of rights with the government's grant of a right to exclude constitut-
ing the essential right that defines a legal entitlement as 'property."'76 Legal
realists rebuffed John Locke's seventeenth century natural rights theory of
property.77 The "realist melange of nominalism, positivism, and pragmatism"
gained momentum in the twentieth century because the realists' "reconceptu-
alization of property ... made it possible for the modem administrative state
to control and restrict various property uses without implicating the constitu-
tional protections of the Takings or Due Process Clauses."78 In other words,
73. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARv. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 108, 112 (1990).
74. Martin P. Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century
America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 442
(1986) (quoting professor Golding, "Although realism was a movement of the
1920s and 30s, its first expression, . . . was Joseph W. Bingham's 1912 article
'What Is the Law?' in which the author expounded, powerfully and with preci-
sion, the underlying theory of a realist legal science.").
75. Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative
State, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 2001, 2004 (2009); see generally Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
76. Mossoff, supra note 75, at 2004.
77. Id. at 2005-06.
78. Id. at 2007-08 ("After legal realism effected its revolution in American law in
the early twentieth century, lawyers and judges conceived of property in the
nominalist terms of 'social relationships' or 'legal relations.'" Id. at 2010).
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the legal realists diluted property rights by empowering the state to interfere
with the exercise of these rights through greater government regulation.79
The conceptual schism in the theory of property between Locke's natural law
view and Hohfeld's legal realist view can be roughly understood in terms of
earning the ownership right through one's merit and labor. Thus, whereas
labor is antecedent to the ownership right in the natural law theory of prop-
erty, to the legal realists "any value in something is merely a consequent of
creating [the] legal entitlement" to exclude others.80 While the natural law
theory allows individuals to define their lives and happiness, the legal realists
theory gives too much latitude to the government to define lives and happi-
ness for individuals.
The legal realists theory derives its philosophical genesis from the legal
positivism of the nineteenth century British jurist John Austin and the twenti-
eth century British legal philosopher H. L. Hart. In his antiquarian concept of
the law, Austin advances two key maxims. The first maxim, known as the
separation thesis, rests on the idea that the law and morality should be segre-
gated.81 The second rests on the notion that "law is a command which obliges
a person or persons," and proceeds "from superiors" to "bind and oblige
inferiors."82 These two maxims aim to show the separation between the laws
of men and the laws of God so as to stress that society's laws should be
based entirely upon man-made laws. Such separation is dangerous for several
reasons. Most notably, it is dangerous because man-made laws have a greater
potential to deviate from objectivity, consistency, and agreement if such laws
are divorced from the higher divine law. The divorce between the two types
of law is troubling because it freely admits the potential to abuse power, as
no objective principle is bound to restrain men in making their laws.83 De-
spite the potential for political abuse, however, this divorce fails to trouble
Austin. "Of the laws or rules set by men to men," Austin insists, "some are
established by political superiors, sovereign and subject: by persons exercis-
ing supreme and subordinate government, in independent nations, or inde-
79. Id. at 2005.
80. Id. at 2015.
81. JOHN AUsTIN & ROBERT CAMPBELL, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: THE Pm-
LOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 16-18 (John Murray ed., 1885). The term separa-
tion thesis refers to the perennial debate between the natural law theorists and
legal positivists about whether morality plays a role in the law. Briefly, while
the natural law theorists think that morality and the law are inseparable, legal
positivists and their theoretical progeny contend that the law and morality must
be separated. See id.
82. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 18 (John Mur-
ray ed., 1832).
83. See John Emerich Edward Dalber, Lord Acton, Acton-Creighton Correspon-
dence [1887], ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/ac-
ton-acton-creighton-correspondence#1fl524_1abel 010 ("Power tends to
corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.").
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pendent political societies."84 In Austin's universe-where the superiors
stand outside the law and order the inferiors to do or refrain from doing one
or another thing-there is no limit on the power and authority of the superi-
ors in creating and interpreting the law. Thus, Austin's view of human beings
is drearily deficient because the so-called inferiors have no voice in the mak-
ing of the law and exist as though to simply obey the superiors.85 Reading
Austin's legal philosophy, one cannot help but have a nagging sense that
humans have very little sense of moral obligation to self-govern by doing
what is objectively good and just and to avoid committing evil.86 Rather,
Austin prefers to sidestep the moral dimension altogether. His entire philoso-
phy rests on viewing the world from a political vantage point. He leaves no
room for metaphysical reality that the natural law theorists have long recog-
nized. Thus, Austin parts with the natural law theory, with the Western tradi-
tion, and with God.
While subscribing to the central notions of Austin's legal positivism,
Hart differs in several respects. First, unlike Austin, Hart believes that man-
made laws can conform to the divine law. In holding such a belief, Hart more
closely associates with the natural law theorists, although they conceive of
law and morality as being necessarily intertwined. It must be noted, however,
that Hart, like Austin, rejected the natural law theory's idea that a human law
that contradicted the divine law simply could not be law.87 Second, Hart de-
parted from Austin's view that law is a command. He argued that:
[T]he command theory . . . seems breathtaking in its simplicity
and quite inadequate. There is much, even in the simplest legal
system, that is distorted if presented as a command. Yet the Utili-
tarians [like Austin and Jeremy Bentham] thought that the essence
of a legal system could be conveyed if the notion of a command
were supplemented by that of a habit of obedience. The simple
scheme was this: What is a command? It is simply an expression
by one person of the desire that another person should do or ab-
stain from some action, accompanied by a threat of punishment
which is likely to follow disobedience. Commands are laws if two
84. Austin, supra note 83, at 2.
85. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651) (explaining Austin's view ineluctably
evokes Thomas Hobbes' dispiriting comment that life is "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short.").
86. As RWM Dias aptly remarks, "The distinction between law and morals and
between 'having an obligation' and 'having a sense of obligation' is important,
but it is even more important that their relationship should not be left out of
account. Law without a sense of obligation is unworkable, which means that
any discussion of law as a functioning phenomenon has to include this moral
dimension." RWM DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 49 (5th ed. 1985) (emphasis added).
87. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 596-97 (1958).
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conditions are satisfied: first, they must be general; second, they
must be commanded by what . . . exists in every political society
whatever its constitutional form, namely, a person or a group of
persons who are in receipt of habitual obedience from most of the
society but pay no such obedience to others. These persons are its
sovereign. Thus law is the command of the uncommanded com-
manders of society-the creation of the legally untrammelled will
of the sovereign who is by definition outside the law.88
Hart considered command theory of law anachronistic and ill-suited in a de-
mocracy like the U.S. He argued:
Austin, in the case of a democracy, looked past the legislators to
the electorate as 'the sovereign' . . . He thought that in the United
States the mass of the electors to the state and federal legislatures
were the sovereign whose commands, given by their 'agents' in
the legislatures, were law. But on this footing the whole notion of
the sovereign outside the law being 'habitually obeyed' by the
'bulk' of the population must go: for in this case the 'bulk' obeys
the bulk, that is, it obeys itself.89
The command theory of the law is unpersuasive to Hart for another reason.
"[I]f laws are merely commands," Hart astutely points out, "it is inexplicable
that we should have come to speak of legal rights and powers as conferred or
arising under them."90 In other words, conceived in terms of a command, law
does not confer rights. Rather, law merely dictates through a sovereign who
is above the law what the inferiors ought to do and abstain from doing.
The notion that there must be a sovereign who exists outside the law,
commands what the law is, and expects unquestionable obedience is troub-
ling. Uncurbed by any intelligible standard, the sovereign is arguably free to
govern as the sovereign sees fit. Such a lowly state of affairs admits of no
certainty or stability. Rather, it encourages governance by arbitrary power
and fosters a concrete threat of political abuse. To curb the threat, there must
be an objective standard that governs the entire society and applies equally to
all societal echelons. To natural law theorists such as Hart, this standard must
function as a limit on the choices people can make.91 Hart, however, dis-
agreed that the standard must necessarily be moral.92 While to the natural law
theorists the word "ought" connotes a moral standard, to Hart the word
''merely reflects the presence of some standard of criticism; one of these
88. Id. at 602-03.
89. Id. at 603-04.
90. Id. at 605.
91. Id. at 629.
92. Id. at 606, 629.
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standards is a moral standard but not all standards are moral."93 Essentially,
Hart feels at ease with the idea that there must be laws informed by princi-
ples other than morality as the natural law theorists conceived it.
3. The Natural Law Theory and the Elevation of Property
Rights
The natural law theorists by and large associate morality with a rational
order that derives from God.94 Despite the permutations of opinions within
the natural law tradition, the key concept of natural law theory is that "there
are indeed some true and valid standards of right conduct."95 This key con-
cept originated with the ancient Greek Stoic philosophers, continued with
Cicero and Plato, and culminated with Saint Thomas Aquinas.96 These theo-
rists and other natural law theorists share one common idea, to wit:
natural law is unchanging over time and does not differ in differ-
ent societies; every person has access to the standards of this
higher law by use of reason; and . .. only just laws "really deserve
[the] name" law, and "in the very definition of the term 'law'
there inheres the idea and principle of choosing what is just and
true." 97
In other words, law is "nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the com-
mon good, promulgated by him [divine being] who has the care of the com-
munity."98 It is a flattering view of human beings to maintain that they are
capable of accessing the higher or divine law through the use of their rea-
son.99 More than that, the idea that human beings structure their society and
laws in accord with a rational order that imitates the divine order and thus
93. H.L.A. Hart, supra note 87, at 613.
94. See generally DIAS, supra note 86, at 472.
95. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3 (Jules
Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds. 2002).
96. BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 68-69 (6th ed. 2012). As
Saint Thomas Aquinas articulated it, the medieval concept of the natural law
theory possessed an inherently teleological nature. Id. at 73. Later, however,
Hugo Grotius secularized the natural law theory by stressing the role of indi-
vidual rights serving as the natural constraints on the government power. Gro-
tius "opened the path for the later liberal natural rights" theorists such as John
Locke.
97. Id. at 68.
98. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 995
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1981) (1948). To put it
bluntly, "[t]he natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it
into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally." Id.
99. Id.
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has clearly defined limits permits of a certainty and stability in which human
beings have certain rights as well as duties.
Unlike legal positivists and legal realists, the natural law jurists con-
ceive of human beings as having a larger role in the development of law and
society. Consistent with that role is the idea that human beings ought to have
concrete legal rights such as property rights that deserve requisite recognition
and protection. As Locke reasoned:
I will not content myself to answer that if it be difficult to make
out property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam
and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man but one
universal monarch should have any property upon a supposition
that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession, ex-
clusive of all the rest of his posterity. But I shall endeavor to show
how men might come to have a property in several parts of that
which God gave to mankind in common. 0 0
Thus, according to Locke, any human being has the potential to acquire prop-
erty. "Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men,"
Locke explained the following:
[Y]et every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of
his hands, . .. are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of
the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his
labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the
common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour some-
thing annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men.
For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer,
no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at
least where there is enough and as good left in common for
others.101
Locke's theory of property rests on a meritocratic premise. So long as one is
willing to invest one's labor and time to, for example, cultivate a piece of
land, one could acquire a property right in that land. Pursuant to Locke's
theory, American law previously defined property as "the exclusive right of
possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing."102 This definition and
Locke's theory, of course, refer to the physical aspects of the property right.
100. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 133-34 (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
1947) (1690).
101. Id. at 134.
102. See, e.g., McKeon v. Bisbee, 9 Cal. 137, 142 (1858) (Burnett, J., concurring).
As Professor Mossoff observed, "jurists in the nineteenth century often em-
ployed Lockean property theory to define the meaning of property within
American law." Mossoff, supra note 15, at 2021.
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However, Locke's conceptual framework can by analogy apply to the intan-
gible aspects of the property right.
In the case of trade secrets, for example, companies invest time and
labor in developing economically valuable information that enables them to
innovate products or services to the exclusion of other companies because the
latter lack the particular information needed to develop a given product or
service. Time and labor are thus distinguishing characteristics in the process
of creating a property right in a tangible as well as an intangible asset. As
Judge Easterbrook aptly noted, "we should treat intellectual and physical
property identically in the law."103 It should not matter that the time and labor
are spent on creating a tangible or an intangible asset. But what should matter
is that individuals and companies have the freedom to create, develop, and
innovate better products and services without the concern that the govern-
ment may arbitrarily trample upon or in some way abrogate this freedom
based upon the notion that if it has the power to grant property rights, then it
can claim that right for return. What also should matter is that individuals
and companies have a clearly recognized property right in what they create,
develop, and innovate.
4. The Two Analytical Modes of Trade Secret Law: Property
and Relational Theories
The notion that a company possesses a property right in its economi-
cally valuable secret business information is far from being novel. On the
contrary, it is quite orthodox in the American jurisprudence of trade secret
law.104 To illustrate, at the emergence of trade secret law in the U.S. in the
nineteenth century, American courts unquestionably treated trade secrets as a
form of property. The first reported case interpreting a trade secret as a prop-
erty right was Vickery.105 In Vickery, the plaintiff contracted with the defen-
dant to buy the latter's chocolate-mills, "together with his exclusive right and
art or secret manner of making chocolate."106 However, defendant denied that
he agreed to refrain from divulging the secret art of making chocolate, argu-
ing that in his real estate deed to plaintiff he solely conveyed tangible assets
103. Easterbrook, supra note 73, at 118.
104. "Trade secret law," Professor Bone explains, "took shape in the late nineteenth
century, and its doctrinal structure developed in response to formalistic concep-
tions of possession and ownership that were popular at the time." Robert G.
Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CALIF. L. REv. 241, 245 (1998). Interestingly, in his article Professor Bone
states that because trade secret law is comprised of various bodies of law such
as tort and contracts, it therefore should be eliminated as an independent basis
of legal protection. Id.
105. See generally Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (1 Pick.) 523 (1837).
106. Id. at 523.
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associated with the sale of the chocolate factory.107 The court disagreed with
defendant and held in plaintiffs favor, in reasoning the following:
The plaintiff was to become the proprietor of the mills, and also of
the secret mode of manufacture which the bond supposes was
used and possessed by the defendant. The defendant was to sell,
the plaintiff was to buy. Now we cannot perceive the least reason
which, after such sale, would enable the defendant lawfully to re-
tain any right in the property or rights sold, nor any right to con-
vey to strangers, any part of what was to be transferred to the
plaintiff. The exclusive right was to be transferred to plaintiff and
we cannot conceive that it would be exclusive, if the defendant
might, after such sale, admit as many persons to participate as
would pay for, or receive gratuitously, the same privilege which
the defendant had granted or stipulated to grant.os
The Vickery court's reference to the defendant's conveyance of the "exclu-
sive right" in manufacturing chocolate unmistakably alludes to the convey-
ance of a property right. Absent this "exclusive right," the plaintiffs
purchase of the defendant's business would contradict basic business sense
because it is precisely the exclusivity of knowing the chocolate manufactur-
ing process that would enable plaintiff to successfully compete in the choco-
late making business.
The court in Peabody v. Norfolk came to the same conclusion as the
Vickery court by treating economically valuable business information as a
form of property.1 09 The Peabody court, however, explicitly referred to trade
secrets as property. "If a man establishes a business," the court observed,
"and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the good will of that busi-
ness is recognized by the law as property."110 In analyzing the court's prose,
107. Id. at 524. The defendant's deed read that defendant conveys his "exclusive
right and arts or secret manner of manufacturing chocolate; hereby declaring,
however, that I have no patent or other exclusive right or arts except what I
have gained by my skill and experience . . . ; and I never have, and do not
hereby even impliedly covenant not to communicate the results of my experi-
ence to others." Id. Read alone, this statement could have been interpreted to
mean that defendant failed to understand that he had a property right in his
chocolate manufacturing process. Id. However, other facts of the case indicate
that defendant was well aware of possessing the property right because, while
vehemently rejecting plaintiffs request to refrain from divulging the secret
manufacturing process, defendant "had exacted an oath or a bond" of several
people "not to divulge" his secret manner of making chocolate "while he
should continue in manufacture." Id.
108. Id. at 526 (emphasis added).
109. See generally Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
110. Id. at 457.
Philopsophical Underpinnings of Trade Secret Law
it becomes apparent that such language is imbued with Locke's conception of
a property right. The court elaborated,
If he invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufac-
ture . . . a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not indeed an
exclusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in
good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a property in it,
which a court of chancery will protect against one who in viola-
tion of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to
his own use, or to disclose it to third persons."'
The view of trade secrets as property predominated in the U.S. until about
1917.
Around 1917, legal realism began to take hold on the minds of promi-
nent American jurists as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., thus diluting the con-
cept of a property right and thereby redefining American trade secret law as
the relationship between trade secret owners and trade secret thieves.112 The
trade secret law's redefinition is best captured in E.L DuPont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Masland, in which Justice Homes reasoned the following:
The word 'property' as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is
an unanlayzed expression of certain secondary consequences of
the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary require-
ments of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable se-
cret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are,
through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may
be denied, but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting
point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintifs. 13
The Masland Court was all too eager to recognize the legal realist con-
cept of the confidential relationship between defendant and plaintiff, even in
111. Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
112. Perhaps the best encapsulation of legal realism comes in this famous quote by
Holmes: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllo-
gism in determining the rules by which men should be governed." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). This quote touches upon
the chasm between the natural law theory and legal realism. While Holmes and
other legal realists crown experience as the determinant of law making, the
natural law theorists underscore human reason and logic in the law making
process.
113. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)
(emphasis added).
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derogation of recognizing a property right in economically valuable secret
business information. As a consequence of legal realism's entry into the
landscape of American jurisprudence, courts can now apply two alternative
methods of analysis to the adjudication of trade secret cases, effectively ad-
ding a layer of unnecessary confusion to an already complicated body of
law.11 4 While one mode of analysis is rooted in Locke's notion of property
law, the other sprouts from the relational rhetoric of legal realism. These two
methods of analysis, produce widely different outcomes in trade secret
cases.i 15
Specifically, trade secret analysis based upon the relational concept
"emphasizes not the boundaries of the information at issue but the asserted
disloyalty of the employee, who is alleged to have owed a one-way duty of
fidelity to the employer."ll 6 Thus, employee liability accrues not from pur-
loining the employer's economically valuable information but from the em-
ployee's abuse of trust, or abuse of the confidential relationship with the
employer.117 Such a mode of analysis is diametrically opposed to the prop-
erty concept of trade secrets. Under the property view, a court's initial in-
quiry begins not in ascertaining whether an employee breached the
employer's trust or fiduciary relationship but on whether the allegedly secret
information is protectable in the first place.1 8 Whether the information is
protectable yields a more objective mode of analysis not because it helps
define the limits of secret business information but because it protects against
third party misappropriations. The relational analysis, however, fails to ac-
count for third party misappropriations of trade secrets because there is no
privity or any conceivable fiduciary nexus between a business and a third
party that purloins the business's economically valuable information. Absent
such a privity or fiduciary nexus, it is nearly impossible to impose liability
upon third parties for stealing economically valuable business information
from its business competitors. Under such an arrangement, no business
would expend its own financial resources to innovate products or services
114. "Courts tend to issue different trade secret rulings depending on whether they
follow a property rights approach or an employer-centric, relational approach."
Graves, supra note 3, at 42.
115. Noteworthy, the relational concept failed to raze the traditional notion of trade
secrets as a form of property right. For instance, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,
the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly stated that trade secrets are a form of prop-
erty as Locke conceived of it. Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
"This general perception of trade secrets as property," the Court explained, "is
consonant with a notion of 'property' that extends beyond land and tangible
goods and includes the products of an individual's 'labour and invention."' Id.
at 1002-03.
116. Graves, supra note 3, at 42.
117. Id. at 49.
118. See id.
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that fail to qualify for patent protection.19 Absent trade secret law that is
capable of giving a potent remedy against third party misappropriations, the
marketplace would exist in an ethical vacuity that rewards individuals for
outsmarting competitors at any price. Thus, the relational mode of analysis
fails to account for two major policies that justify trade secret law. The mode
of analysis fails to explain trade secret law's encouragement of economic
development and innovation, and it is oblivious to the need of fostering com-
mercial ethics and fair competition in the marketplace.
5. Trade Secret Law Promotes Ethical Business Conduct and
Fair Competition
Viewing trade secrets as a form of property fosters commercial ethics,
or fair play, in the marketplace because the notion of property necessarily
conveys a strong sense that what belongs to a certain individual or business
demands a greater respect for the limits that the ownership right intimates.120
In other words, fair play helps define what is permissible business conduct
and what is proper competition. It is partially due to the presence of fair play
that trade secret law permits reverse engineering and independent discov-
ery.121 Business competitors know that they can develop certain secret busi-
ness information by fair and honest means. In turn, knowing what
permissible business conduct and proper competition are in the marketplace
is vital to fostering efficiency and allowing parties who stand in confidential
119. Some might argue that patent law can protect against third party theft of infor-
mation. Patent law, however, is not an attractive option in this case because it
requires disclosure of information before it can render its protection. Patent law
and trade secret law serve different goals, which is partially why the Supreme
Court held that both bodies of law co-exist. Specifically, to claim protection
under trade secret law, the need for the information to remain secret is impera-
tive. Secrecy, however, is not a requirement in claiming protection under patent
law. Quite the contrary, in receiving patent law's protection, the patentee is
compelled to publicly disclose the patented invention. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bi-
cron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475, 481 (1974).
120. In Kewanee, the Supreme Court referred to trade secret law's policy of com-
mercial ethics as standard that helps reinforce the import of good faith and fair
dealing in commercial transactions. Id. at 481-82.
121. Independent discovery and reverse engineering represent defenses to trade se-
cret misappropriation claim. However, to succeed in reverse engineering de-
fense, a business must show that it meticulously documented its steps in
developing the information and its substantial efforts resulted not merely in
unveiling of a trade secret, but also in a creation of a unique product or service.
It is important to note that while reverse engineering may be an effective de-
fense to a trade secret allegation, it still remains vulnerable to patent infringe-
ment claims. ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING
TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS (3d ed. 2003).
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relationships to freely share secret business information.122 Absent knowl-
edge of what is permissible business conduct, "the protection of intellectual
property would not exist. . . . The pirating of commercially valuable ideas
would be commonplace. Fear and suspicion would permeate every transac-
tion. Any idea of value could be bought or sold from even the most trusted
employees." 123 Thus, "[t]he legal protection of trade secrets stabilizes the re-
lationship of people in commercial transactions by providing rules of fair
play which govern even in the absence of an express contract."1 24 In turn,
more stable business relationships allow businesses to expend significantly
less money on trying to maintain the secrecy of their economically valuable
trade information.125
One corollary of more stable business relationships is the lower produc-
tion costs that enable businesses to sell their products and services at a price
accessible to a wider market.126 Further, another corollary is that stable busi-
ness relationships stimulate businesses' incentive to innovate because they
are more willing to invest large sums of money into the development of new
products or services when they can expect fair competition. More impor-
tantly, more stable business relationships boost the economy, expand the job
market, and improve the overall quality of life across societal echelons.
However, the stability of business relationships depends upon an or-
ganic development that begins with conceiving trade secrets as property. The
property concept facilitates an understanding that a trade secret belongs to a
business by stressing that a non-owner of the trade secret cannot overstep
without suffering serious ramifications. No other legal views can comprehen-
sively convey this strong sense of limits. Neither contractual nor another re-
lational theory standing alone can impart this strong sense of clearly defined
limits in obtaining the competitor's trade secrets. The relational theories
merely pertain to the enforcement of limits in the employer-employee con-
text whereas the property theory draws those limits in a third party context as
well.
122. PAPPAS & QUICK, supra note 19, § 7 at A-1.
123. JAGER, supra note 5, at § 1:3.
124. Id. In his treatise on trade secret law, Jager notes that various societies recog-
nized the importance of commercial morality and protection of trade secrets.
Id. For instance, in ancient Rome the actio servi corrupti, or the action for
corrupting a slave, resembled trade secret misappropriation cause of action and
leveled the double measure of actual damages against the third party who eg-
ged on the slave to divulge trade secrets. Id. The double measure of actual
damages served to deter future instances of trade secret theft. Id.
125. Risch, supra note 2, at 5. "[T]he primary benefit of trade secret law," Professor
Risch observes, "is the decrease in both the amount spent on protecting secrets
and the amount spent by those who seek to learn them." Id. at 26.
126. Id. at 27-28.
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III. CONCLUSION
While some critics find trade secret law to be a befuddling bundle of
legal concepts that lack an independent legal basis and instead draw upon
such ingrained legal principles as torts and contract,1 27 the proponents of
trade secret law readily discern a great benefit that trade secret law affords to
businesses in the economy. 128 The proponents maintain that the lack of trade
secret law's independent legal basis should not militate against its existence.
On the contrary, trade secret law's powerful incentive to innovation, stabili-
zation of business relationships, and economic stimulation should put all
doubts about trade secret law's existence beyond question. Instead, the focus
of inquiry on trade secret law should be on the potency of its legal remedy
against trade secret misappropriations by employees and third party
competitors.
Neither contract nor tort law by itself can afford an adequate deterrent
against trade secret misappropriations because these bodies of law merely
serve as enforcement devices that nonetheless represent an essential supple-
ment to trade secret law. Despite their intangible nature, trade secrets need to
be recognized as property, A la Locke, for at least two reasons. First, recog-
nizing trade secrets as property instills a strong sense of limits inherent in the
concept of ownership. Second, the concept of ownership rests on the univer-
sally recognized principle of acquiring any type of asset through investing
time and labor in the development of a given product, service, or method.
Only when trade secrets are widely recognized to be property can there be
clear expectations of business and employee behavior, creating respect for
the assets that belong to another.
127. See generally Bone, supra note 104.
128. See generally Chiappetta, supra note 6.
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